Eastern Orthodoxy’s Misplaced Rejection of the Immaculate Conception

Whether this represents a genuine theological dispute or rather an outgrowth of ecclesiastical politics is the question which this article begins to consider.

The Historical Context

From the time Pius IX defined the Immaculate Conception up through the First Vatican Council, which defined the dogma of papal infallibility in 1870, Catholic/Orthodox relations were particularly fraught. The rise of nationalism coupled with geopolitical maneuvering within the Ottoman and Russian empires militated against any rapprochement between the two communions. Moreover, Pius IX’s 1848 apostolic letter, Litterae ad Orientales (Epistle to the Easterners), which urged the Orthodox to return to communion with Rome, was met by a harsh rebuke several months later in an encyclical signed by the Patriarch of Constantinople, along with those of Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem. While some have opined that this exchange helped clarify the theological differences between the two camps, others see the affair—though perhaps well intentioned on Pius IX’s part—as a mild disaster.

Several decades later and on into the early 20th century, intellectuals within the Russian Empire began to seriously consider union with Rome on both an individual and macro level. For centuries, the Russian Orthodox Church had been stripped of its patriarch and placed squarely under the thumb of the Tsar. The so-called “Synodal Period,” which ran from 1721 to 1917, embraced a committee-style form of church governance overseen by a Tsar-appointed chief procurator. The purpose of this radical reform was ostensibly to modernize the Russian Orthodox Church; improve clergy education; and integrate it into the larger political ambitions of Russia. For critics, it represented a betrayal of the Russian Orthodox Church itself and the spiritual patrimony of Russia.

Following Tsar Nicholas II’s policy of religious tolerance in 1905, Greek Catholics began to make inroads in Russia, leading to modest pockets of converts uniting with the Catholic Church, thus laying the groundwork for the formation of the Russian Greek Catholic Church. This movement was supported by Pope St. Pius X, who directed that this nascent Russian Church and those joining it should not compromise their Byzantine liturgical heritage nor be subject to Latin Catholic bishops. Notably, Russian Catholicism also embraced the practices of so-called “Old Believers” or “Old Ritualists”—Russian Christians who had been persecuted by the Russian state since the 17th century for their refusal to accept a spectrum of liturgical reforms and practices instituted in the 1660s. 

Positive interest in Catholicism continued among certain sectors of the intelligentsia, though this and the growth of Russian Catholicism was disrupted by the 1917 Russian Revolution. Many Russian churchmen, including the philosopher and theologian Fr. Sergius Bulgakov, were imprisoned, executed, or exiled. Those Russians fortunate enough to either flee westward or, like Bulgakov, find themselves removed from Russia, quickly came face to face with Latin Catholicism. It was during this time and in subsequent decades that anti-Catholic attitudes began to harden among the Russian diaspora. While notable exceptions did exist (see more below), prominent voices like Bulgakov began to rebuke several Catholic teachings, including the Immaculate Conception. 

A True Source of Division?

Bulgakov’s critique of the Immaculate Conception, though highly misplaced, was not nearly as venomous as those emanating from less refined quarters of diaspora Orthodoxy. Still, others believed that Orthodox hostility toward the dogma represented a fundamental misunderstanding of Eastern Christian history. 

In a widely circulated article, Fr. Lev Gillet, a French Catholic who converted to Russian Orthodoxy in 1928, offered a detailed overview of the controversy concerning the Immaculate Conception. Though its precise contents cannot be recalled in detail here, he concluded his piece with the following poignant observations.

1. The Immaculate Conception of Mary is not a defined dogma in the Orthodox Church.
2. One can say that since the first part of the nineteenth century the majority of Orthodox believers and theologians have taken their stand against this doctrine.
3. Nevertheless, it is impossible to say that from the Orthodox point of view the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception constitutes a heresy; for canonically it has never been defined as such by an ecumenical council and in fact it has never met with the disapproval of a universal and unchanging consensus of opinion.
4. There does exist a continuous line of eminent Orthodox authorities who have taught the Immaculate Conception.
5. Therefore the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception has every right to its existence in the Orthodox Church as an opinion of a school or as a personal theologoumenon based on a tradition worthy of respect.
6. It follows therefore that the Roman definition of 1854 does not constitute an obstacle to the reunion of the Eastern and Western Churches.
7. It is my own view that not only does the Immaculate Conception not contradict any Orthodox dogma but that it is a necessary and logical development of the whole of Orthodox belief.

Fr. Gillet’s observations dovetail with those of other scholars such as Alex Roman who has compiled numerous examples of the Immaculate Conception being embraced among sectors of Eastern Orthodoxy prior to the mid-19th century. In his opinion, the theological dispute over the Immaculate Conception has nothing to do with the Blessed Virgin’s sinlessness (which both sides accept), but rather with disputes over the meaning of original sin. Whether accurate or not (and there are compelling arguments that the original sin debate is largely driven by misunderstanding), it is telling that overt and widespread Orthodox rejection of the Immaculate Conception did not appear front and center until after Pius IX defined it in 1854.

Some Final Considerations

Although this article does not pretend to cover the panoply of opinions on the Immaculate Conception found among the Eastern Orthodox today, it is difficult to separate Orthodox criticisms of Catholic dogma from ecclesiastical politics. As noted, Orthodoxy has been beholden to nationalism since at least the 19th century, with attitudes such as “to be Greek is to be Orthodox” or “to be Russian is to be Orthodox.” This has long instilled in Orthodoxy a kneejerk anti-Western attitude that quickly bleeds into unthoughtful anti-Catholic hostility. At the same time, periods of Latin Catholic chauvinism toward Eastern Christianity as a whole have contributed to tense relations not just with the Orthodox, but fellow Catholics who belong to one of the 23 sui iuris Eastern Catholic churches. 

In the present moment, the Russian Orthodox Church—Eastern Orthodoxy’s single largest body—has wed itself to the Russkiy Mir (Russian World) ideology which, inter alia, views Russia as a civilizational force against the West. Concomitant with this ideology is a belief that Catholicism has no place in what it views as Russia’s “historic homelands,” including Ukraine. While the Vatican continues to thoughtlessly appease the Russian Orthodox to this day, the Russians see no need to return the favor. In the Russian Orthodox perspective, the Catholic Church is a heretical and schismatic body unworthy of sympathetic engagement. Unfortunately, the ecumenists in Rome never received the memo.

Conclusion

From this compact overview, it becomes apparent that Eastern Orthodoxy’s fervent rejection of the Immaculate Conception arises only after the Russian Revolution. Further, despite this teaching’s strong roots in the Eastern Christian tradition, this rejection persists to this day. Yet as Fr. Gillet has shown, the Orthodox have no firm theological basis to reject the Immaculate Conception. Unfortunately, due to the persistence of nationalism in historic Orthodox countries coupled with geopolitics, the Catholic Church remains a “Western institution” by Orthodox lights which must be opposed for mundane political reasons.