Can an apostate from the Catholic Church save his soul if he dies in the state of unrepented apostasy?

An apostate is a person who once was a Catholic, and who has now abandoned all practice of religion. Having received and believed the Catholic Faith, and known at least something of the supernatural order of grace, it is not possible for such a person to be in good faith, as it might conceivably be for a Protestant who stopped the practice of his false religion. The reason for this is that good faith presupposes invincible ignorance. Invincible ignorance is only possible for those who have no possibility of knowing the truth concerning divine revelation, and whose ignorance is consequently not culpable. One who has had the theological virtue of faith infused at baptism, and has had at least some instruction in the Catholic Faith cannot possibly be in invincible ignorance. He may, certainly, be in ignorance as to the true Church and her teachings, but if he is, it is his own fault, and his ignorance is vincible. It seems that the only exceptions to this would be baptized Catholics who had never been taught anything of the Faith, nor had any Catholic examples as role models.

The Catholic Church refuses Christian burial to all public sinners, including public apostates who are unrepentant. If they give some sign of repentance before death, even if it is only a probable sign, such as the expression of sorrow for their stubbornness or the desire to see a priest, the Church can have some hope for their eternal salvation and consequently authorizes Christian burial. Needless to say, however, only God can judge the soul, so that it is still permissible to pray privately and offer Masses privately for such apostates who have given no sign of repentance.

However, it is not for us to forgive injuries done against Almighty God or against others. We are not those who have been offended, insulted, attacked, calumniated, and it is not our honor that is in question. It is consequently not for us to forgive, but for God Himself, or for the persons concerned. In such instances, of course, we have the duty to pray for the enemies of God, that they might convert and ask for pardon, that they might understand the gravity of the insults directed against God and His friends, or against the Blessed Virgin or the Church. However, it is not in our power to forgive an injury that is not directed against us. How frequent this situation is with respect to God, and how great a desire of making reparation it enkindles in our hearts! Yet only God, who is offended, can forgive, and then only when pardon is requested of Him.  [Answered by Fr. Peter R. Scott]

Consequently, this politically correct term "Judeo-Christian heritage" must be regarded as vague, deliberately ambiguous, liberal, favoring indifferentism and ecumenism, and not at all orthodox.  [Answered by Fr. Peter R. Scott]

It is only in appearance that this pious belief is in contradiction with the teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas given above, based as it is on the fact that the poor souls cannot merit, and cannot hear our prayers in God. Although it is not a dogma, Catholics are consequently free to believe that they can pray to poor souls, nor is this belief in any way reprobated by the Church, but to the contrary recommended by some theologians.  [Answered by Fr. Peter R. Scott]

However, the poor souls in purgatory have all the three theological virtues and necessarily so. If they did not have the theological virtue of charity they would have been condemned to hell. Yet despite their certitude of one day doing so, they do not at the present time see or possess God. They consequently have the infused supernatural virtues of faith and hope, by which they believe what they will one day see, and hope for what they will one day possess.  [Answered by Fr. Peter R. Scott]

Let us, then, not hesitate to attribute to Blessed Virgin Mary the magnificent title of "divine," which so aptly describes the greatness of this greatest of all creatures, her prerogatives, and her power. And logical with ourselves, let us then not hesitate to consecrate ourselves totally and unreservedly to her. [Answered by Fr. Peter R. Scott]

Hence it is perfectly true to say that we adore the wood of the Cross, but we do not adore Mary, although she is infinitely greater than the wood of the Cross considered in itself.  [Answered by Fr. Peter R. Scott]

Is it not opposed to free will for our prayers to be answered?

When we pray for others we do not require of God to take away their free will or to compel them in some way against their will. We pray, to the contrary, that God’s grace might move, inspire and actualize their free will, so that no longer being slaves to their passions, they might act out of free will. We pray as God’s instruments, exerting the influence of our prayers to bring about the will of God. We pray out of docility to grace, that others might be docile also. Far from taking away free will our prayers, which are directed to God, from whose majesty all graces come, play the role in Divine Providence of obtaining for souls all the graces they need in order to be free. [Answered by Fr. Peter R. Scott]

If Adam had not sinned, would we have been born with sanctifying grace?

St. Thomas Aquinas explains that the formal element in original sin is "the privation of original justice, whereby the will was made subject to God" (ST, I-II, Q. 82, A. 3). This means that what it really and properly consists in is the loss of sanctifying grace, and not the sinful concupiscence and disorders which are the consequence of original sin. Adam sinned as head of the entire human race. Hence, if he had likewise preserved original justice, as head of the entire human race, then he would not have passed on original sin to his descendance, but instead sanctifying grace. Consequently, if Adam had not sinned, we would have been born with sanctifying grace.  [Answered by Fr. Peter R. Scott]

If Eve only, and not Adam, had sinned, would we have been born with original sin?

St. Thomas Aquinas himself asks this very question (ST, Ia IIae, Q. 81, A. 5). His answer is very clear. Original sin is transferred through Adam and not through Eve, and so consequently, if Adam had not sinned we would not have inherited original sin, whereas if Adam had sinned, but not Eve, we would still have inherited it.

His answer is based upon Sacred Scripture, that states that "by one man," that is Adam, "sin entered into this world" (Rom. 5:12). Scripture does not say by one woman, nor by two parents, but by one man. Consequently, it is a part of our Faith that original sin is contracted only from Adam. St. Thomas explains this by saying that it is through the process of generation that original sin is transferred. However, the mover or the active principle of generation is the father, and not the mother. Hence it is Adam who transmits original sin to us, although Eve was the first to commit the sin.  [Answered by Fr. Peter R. Scott]

When we speak of God suffering on account of the sins of men, we speak of the sufferings of God the Son in His human nature, paying the debt of our sins. If this is said of the Godhead, it is meant improperly to indicate how great is the offense made to the Divine Majesty by our sins, but not that God actually suffers from them.  [Answered by Fr. Peter R. Scott]

Why are there different translations of Genesis 3:15, some indicating that the woman’s seed will crush the serpent’s head, and others that it is His Mother herself will do it?

After the story of the Fall and of the punishment to be inflicted on sinful mankind, Almighty God curses the serpent and promises the Redeemer, seed of the woman, that is of the Blessed Virgin Mary, saying that He will place enmities between the serpent and the woman, and between his seed and the woman’s seed: "She will crush your head and you will lie in wait for her heel."

Such is the translation of the Vulgate (ipsa), namely that she will crush the serpent’s head, as confirmed by the translator, St. Jerome, in his writings. Scripture scholars point out that the Greek text of the Septuaginta, and all the original Hebrew manuscripts except two, state that it is he, that is the seed of the woman, who will crush the serpent’s head. How can this be, you might think, since the Council of Trent guaranteed that the translation of the Vulgate is without error? How could St. Jerome have made such an obvious error?

Of course, there is no error at all, and St. Jerome deliberately translated it indicating that the Blessed Mother would crush the serpent’s head. Here his translation is guided by the Catholic Faith, and makes a little more explicit the role of the Blessed Virgin in destroying the serpent, which role is already manifestly contained in this very text. Clearly, if there is enmity between the serpent and the Blessed Virgin, and not just between the seed of one and the seed of the other, this means that the Blessed Virgin is perfectly united to Our Lord’s work of destroying the devil’s power. Together with her seed, she crushes the head of the devil. St. Jerome’s translation is consequently equally correct, and has the advantage of bringing out a little more clearly the role of Our Lady. It was made in the light of the teaching of the Fathers, without whose interpretation we cannot understand Holy Scripture. Pope Pius IX used the patristic application of this text to Our Lady to establish the Immaculate Conception (Ineffabilis Deus).  [Answered by Fr. Peter R. Scott]

Is the upcoming October canonization of Msgr. Jose Maria Escriva de Balaguer to be considered infallible or not?

The huge number of the present Pontiff’s canonizations have certainly been a great concern to us, for the traditional rules contained in Canon Law, to prevent any possibility of error or of canonization of a person whose faith and life were not perfectly exemplary, have been done away with, and replaced with much less demanding rules. However, hitherto they have been all pre-Vatican II St.s, and very holy Catholics. But the projected canonization of the founder of the Opus Dei is different. For he it was who anticipated and developed 30 years before Vatican II a revolutionary, new, secular theology of the laity, and accepted the principle of pluralism, accepting into the Opus Dei men of every faith and religion.¹ This indifferentism cannot be considered, according to any traditional guidelines, as an example of sanctity.

It is indeed accepted by the theologians as theologically certain that the Church is infallible in the solemn canonization of the St.s, as distinct from the beatification of the blessed.² The reason for this is that a canonization is not just a permission for the honor of a St., as is a beatification. It is a definition, and a command, made by the Sovereign Pontiff with the use of his full authority, and consequently binding on Catholics. Consequently it is similar to a profession of faith, having as its object the glory of the St. in heaven.

However, not all canonized St.s are solemnly declared by the Church as such. In the first ten centuries of the Church’s history, the popes simply gave their approval to the veneration of St.s and martyrs by the faithful. These are known today as St.s. However, since there was no solemn canonization process, the full authority and infallibility of the Church are not engaged for such St.s. Consequently, it is not the fact that a person is called a "St." that makes it infallible, but the solemn declaration and definition by the Sovereign Pontiff, as binding on all Catholics. It is upon this that the answer to the question concerning the infallibility of the canonization of Escriva depends. If the decree defines formally and obliges the acceptation of his sanctity, then it will be infallible, regardless of the defects in the processes for the canonization of St.s that exist since Vatican II. However, if the decree of canonization were not to be solemn, and not to contain such expressions as "we define" and "we command" the veneration of this St., then it would not be infallible, just as the approval of canonized St.s in the early centuries of the Church. The same applied to Vatican II, for by not wanting to define doctrines clearly, it refused to use the infallible authority of the Extraordinary Magisterium that it could have used to condemn heresy.

The question then arises as to whether, if the canonization is duly performed with solemnity, we are bound to venerate this particular St. as a model and patron. St. Thomas states that the veneration that we display towards the St.s is "that by which we believe that they share the glory of the St.s." ³ The object of the canonization is then the St.s’ vision of God in heaven, and only indirectly the sanctity of their life and its value as a model for us. These are consequently not the object of the infallible definition, and although they would not normally be questioned in a canonized St., in such a particular case it would seem possible to seriously doubt these, whilst still accepting that the canonized St. is in heaven. We could consequently accept that Msgr. Escriva is a St. in heaven, (hardly surprising for a priest, given his conservative mindset, genuine piety, frequent reception of the sacraments) without accepting in any way the pluralism and secularism that he taught.

Where will unbaptized children (and aborted babies) go on the day of the Last Judgment?

It is not a doctrine of Faith that children dying with original sin only on their soul go to a special place or state called the children’s Limbo. However, it is the common opinion of the theologians. This is based upon the teaching of Pope Innocent III (and the Fathers of the Church) on the effects of baptism, in which he has this to say:

The punishment of original sin is deprivation of the vision of God, but the punishment of actual sin is the torments of everlasting hell. (Maiores Ecclesiae causas, Dz 780).

The state of Limbo is consequently a suffering from the pain of loss, or separation from God, but not of the pain of the senses. As St. Thomas Aquinas teaches (De malo 5, 3), such a pain of loss is compatible with a certain natural happiness. At the last judgment, when the bodies will rise to share in the punishment or reward of heaven or hell, the bodies of those who are in Limbo will also rise. Although separated from God, in which way they share the punishment of the damned in hell, they will not be tormented by remorse nor will they suffer the pain of the sense which the damned suffer forever in hell.

The denial of this common teaching by the heretical council of Pistoia was condemned by Pope Pius VI as "false, rash, injurious to Catholic schools." Here is his description of the erroneous doctrine:

The doctrine which rejects as a Pelagian fable that place of the lower regions (which the faithful generally designate by the name of the limbo of children) in which the souls of those departing with the sole guilt of original sin, are punished with the punishment of the condemned, exclusive of the punishment of fire... (Auctorem Fidei, Dz 1526).  [Answered by Fr. Peter R. Scott]

In what way was Pope John XXII’s statement concerning the soul’s possession of the Beatific Vision wrong? Surely the souls in Purgatory cannot possess the Beatific Vision.

The question did not concern the souls who are in Purgatory, but the souls separated from the body after the time of their purification in Purgatory. From 1331 until 1333 he preached and wrote that these souls could only have a vision of the human nature of Christ, and that they could not see God face to face, i.e., the divine essence. He also taught that the wicked could not go to hell nor the good to heaven before the day of the last judgment, on which day the general resurrection of the body will take place. Here precisely lay his error.

On the day before his death, December 3, 1334 he issued a Bull (Ne super his) in the presence of the College of Cardinals formally and solemnly revoking this opinion. His successor, Pope Benedict XII, published this document, along with his own Constitution, Benedictus Deus, of January 29, 1336, which declared authoritatively and perpetually concerning the matter, namely that after the purgation (for those who are in need of it) the souls of the blessed..:

...even before the resumption of their bodies and the general judgment...have been, are and will be in heaven... and have seen and see the divine essence by intuitive vision, and even face to face... (Dz, 1000).

It also defines that the damned will go immediately to hell after their death, where they are tortured by infernal punishments (Dz, 1002).  [Answered by Fr. Peter R. Scott]

I do not understand how it can be affirmed that baptism in an heretical church gives the character of baptism but does not give sanctifying grace, so that person remains with original and actual sins (Cf. Fr. Laisney, "Three Errors of the Feeneyites," The Angelus, September 1998, p.35ff.)?

You are perfectly correct in affirming that the sacrament of baptism is not invalidated by the fact that it is administered by an heretical minister. This is in fact the teaching of the Council of Trent, which anathematized the contrary opinion: "If anyone shall say that the baptism, which is also given by heretics in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, with the intention of doing what the Church does, is not true baptism: let him be anathema" (Session vii, canon 4; Dz, 860). Nevertheless, it does not follow from the fact that baptism by an heretic can be valid that it is always valid. It can be invalid if the minister uses an incorrect matter or form, or if he does not have the intention of doing what the Church does.

However, this is not the essential confusion. A distinction must be made between a valid sacrament and a fruitful sacrament. A valid sacrament of baptism is one which imprints the baptismal character on the soul. However, it does not follow from the fact that it is valid, that it is necessarily fruitful, removing sin, infusing sanctifying grace, making a person a child of God, and opening the gates of heaven. There can be an obex, or impediment, to the sacrament infusing grace. In such instances the sacrament will be valid, but fruitless, for as long as the obstacle remains.

St. Thomas Aquinas makes this distinction very clearly in the Summa Theologica, IIIa, Q. 68, A. 8, where he states that "baptism produces a two-fold effect on the soul, viz. the character and grace." He continues to explain that the Catholic Faith is not necessary for the validity of the sacrament, that is, for the baptismal character:

Right faith is not necessary in the one baptized any more than in the one who baptizes; provided that the other conditions are fulfilled which are necessary for the validity of the sacrament. For the sacrament is not perfected by the righteousness of the minister or of the recipient of Baptism, but by the power of God.

However, if the true Faith is not necessary for the validity of the sacrament, the absence of the supernatural Faith of the Catholic Church will prevent the sacrament from bearing the fruit that it ought: "A thing is necessary for Baptism, as something without which grace, which is the ultimate effect of the sacrament, cannot be had. And thus right Faith is necessary for Baptism..." The knowing and willing refusal to embrace the true Faith is consequently, like the refusal to make an act of at least imperfect contrition, an obstacle to the sacrament bearing the fruit of sanctifying grace. Hence the valid sacrament does not remit sin.

St. Thomas also considers the case of insincerity, when a person remains attached to a mortal sin, which insincerity is not changed by the sacrament of baptism, which consequently remains valid but fruitless:

When God changes man’s will from evil to good, man does not approach with insincerity. But God does not always do this. Nor is this the purpose of the sacrament, that an insincere man (i.e., attached to mortal sin) be made sincere, but that he who comes in sincerity be justified (ST, IIIa, Q. 69, A. 9, ad 2).

In ST, Q. 68, A. 9, St. Thomas considers the special case of infants, who are not capable of placing obstacles to prevent the sacrament bearing fruit, just as they are not capable of having their own intention. It is for this reason that a valid sacrament is always fruitful for them: "Children before the use of reason, being as it were in the womb of their mother the Church, receive salvation not by their own act, but by the act of the Church" (ST, IIIa, Q. 68, A. 9, ad 1).  Thus it is that infants when baptized are members of the Catholic Church, even if baptized by heretical ministers in heretical churches, until such time as they embrace the heresy of their Protestant church (which is presumed at the age of 14 years), and this regardless of "the unbelief of their own parents" (ibid. ad 2), for "the child acquires a good conscience in himself, not indeed as to the act, but as to the habit, by sanctifying grace" (ad 3). In infants, therefore, the baptismal character is inseparable from the infusion of sanctifying grace and of the supernatural virtue (or habitus) of Faith, and the remission of original sin, regardless of the church in which a person is validly baptized. Cf. ST, IIIa, Q. 69, A. 6, ad 3: "So that children believe, not by their own act, but by the Faith of the Church, which is applied to them: –by the power of which faith, grace and virtues are bestowed on them."

The final case to be considered is that of an adult who is baptized validly in a Protestant church, but who is not formally attached to the errors of that church, and who does not willingly and knowingly chose to be baptized in an heretical church which refuses the true Faith. If he truly believes all that he knows that God has revealed (including at least the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Redemption and Heaven and Hell), and on the basis of the supernatural motive of the authority of God who reveals (and not for human, social or political reasons), and if he would believe everything that the Catholic Church believes and teaches if he knew about its dogmas, and if he would willingly join the Catholic Church if he knew it to be the true Church, then his faith is truly supernatural. It is the right faith (fides recta) of which St. Thomas speaks.

This falls into the case of invincible ignorance, which Pope Pius IX describes in the encyclical Quanto Conficiamur Moerore of August 10, 1863, which explains the meaning of the dogma Extra Ecclesiam nulla salus. As the pope explains, such a person will not be punished for an ignorance for which he is not culpable or responsible, and which he does not have the means to overcome.

If there is no other obstacle (e.g., attachment to mortal sin), then the baptism of an adult with such supernatural faith will also infuse sanctifying grace and remove original and actual sins, even if done in a Protestant church.  [Answered by Fr. Peter R. Scott]

Is it true that only Masses under Quo Primum are representative of the Catholic religion?

The reason why the New Mass fails to be truly representative of the Roman Catholic religion is not just because it is a break from Quo Primum. It is true that Quo Primum gives the guarantee that the Tridentine Mass is Catholic and that priests will have the right to celebrate it "in perpetuity."  But Quo Primum does not state that a subsequent pope could not approve a different rite of Mass, and in fact there are many different Eastern and Western rites of Mass which are perfectly Catholic, all traditional, preceding the Council of Trent by 200 years. What makes the New Mass not representative of the Catholic Faith is the fact that it contains modernist ideas and omissions which are in direct contradiction with the Catholic theology of the Mass as defined by the Council of Trent (cf. Ottaviani Intervention). This is why it is a grave danger to the Faith, and why priests should not celebrate it, nor should the faithful assist at it, under pain of sin.  [Answered by Fr. Peter R. Scott]

What is Ecumenism?

The description of this movement of dialogue and mutual exchange on religious questions with non-Catholics, and this on a basis of equality, is first made in a papal Encyclical of Pope Pius XI, in Mortalium animos, "On Fostering True Religious Unity", published in 1928.

This is the pope’s description: 

Assured that there exist few men who are entirely devoid of the religious sense, they seem to ground on this belief a hope that all nations, while differing indeed in religious matters, may yet without great difficulty be brought to fraternal agreement on certain points of doctrine which will form a common basis of the spiritual life. With this object, congresses, meetings, and addresses are arranged, attended by a large concourse of hearers, where all without distinction, unbelievers of every kind as well as Christians, even those who unhappily have rejected Christ and denied His divine nature or mission, are invited to join in the discussion. (§2)

Follows immediately afterwards the pope’s condemnation of "the pan-christians", whose "fair and alluring words cloak a most grave error, subversive of the foundations of the Catholic Faith" (§3): 

Such efforts can meet with no kind of approval among Catholics. They presuppose the erroneous view that all religions are more or less good and praiseworthy (this is the error of indifferentism), inasmuch as all give expression, under various forms, to that innate sense which leads men to God and to the obedient acknowledgment of His rule. Those who hold such a view are not only in error; they distort the true idea of religion, and thus reject it, falling gradually into naturalism and atheism. To favor this opinion, and to encourage such undertakings is tantamount to abandoning the religion revealed by God. (§2)

In his Instruction of the Ecumenical Movement (Instructio de Motione Oecumenica) in 1949, Pope Pius XII ordered that, in opposition to such "dangerous indifferentism", "Catholic doctrine must be propounded and explained in its totality and in its integrity. It is not permitted to pass over in silence or to veil in ambiguous terms what is comprised in the Catholic truth on the true nature and stages of justification, on the constitution of the Church, on the primacy of jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiff, on the unique true union by the return of separated Christians to the one true Church of Christ".

And yet, this is precisely what has not been done since Vatican II, in attempting to follow the contrary request not to offend the sensitivities of our "separated brethren" in the Vatican II Decree "On Ecumenism" Unitatis Redintegratio. This is how that document defines Ecumenism, with none of the precautions laid out by Pope Pius XII against indifferentism: 

The term "ecumenical movement" indicates the initiatives and activities encouraged and organized …to promote Christian unity (i.e., the apparent unity, outside the truth, of different denominations or churches getting along). These are: first, every effort to avoid expressions, judgments and actions which do not represent the condition of our separated brethren with truth and fairness and so make mutual relations with them more difficult. 

The document also lists as other ecumenical activities dialogue, cooperation for the common good of humanity and common prayer (U.R. §4). These activities are all based upon the belief, already condemned in advance by Pope Pius XI, that all religions are more or less good or praiseworthy, expressed in this way in the Vatican II document on Ecumenism: 

Separated communities and churches as such …have been by no means deprived of significance and importance in the mystery of salvation. For the spirit of Christ has not refrained from using them as means of salvation (U.R. §3).

Clearly this leaves no place for the defined dogma, "Outside the Church, no salvation" (Lateran IV, Dz 802).  [Answered by Fr. Peter R. Scott]

Are Catholics bound in conscience to accept all papal teachings, or just infallible teachings?

Clearly Catholics have a duty to obey all Church teachings. However, there are varying degrees of obligation according to the different degree of authority that is attached to the teaching, and to how it is presented. You will find these distinctions in any standard textbook of dogmatic theology.

• Dogmas defined ex cathedra must be accepted under pain of losing the Faith, in such a way that a person who professes the direct contradictory of an act of the extraordinary Magisterium defining such a dogma, is correctly called a heretic.

• Dogmas are frequently taught infallibly by the Ordinary Magisterium of the Church. Clearly we owe them the adhesion of our Faith, and a person who would knowingly deny one of these would be a formal heretic. The problem, however, is that of determining what really is a part of the Ordinary Magisterium (i.e., that which has always and everywhere been taught), and consequently that which really is infallible. This is the work of theology, but since human judgments are involved errors can enter in. It is consequently often not possible to call a person who denies such a dogma a formal heretic, until such time as his error has been condemned by an act of the Extraordinary Magisterium. This is what was done at the Council of Trent for the protestant errors, for example concerning justification and the sacraments.

• There are other teachings of the Church which are neither a part of the Extraordinary Magisterium nor a part of the Ordinary Magisterium, but which are authentically proposed by the Church. This includes the bulk of the teachings in the papal encyclicals. Such teachings of the Authentic Magisterium are not infallible, but cannot be discarded for as much. As Pius XII stated in Humani Generis, and as John Paul II has reiterated, such teachings must be accepted with reverential respect. Allow me to quote from Humani Generis:

Nor must it be thought that what is expounded in Encyclical Letters does not of itself demand consent, since in writing such Letters the Popes do not exercise the supreme power of their Teaching Authority. For…generally what is expounded and inculcated in Encyclical Letters already for other reasons appertains to Catholic doctrine. (§20)

However, since they do not invoke the full authority of the Church and are not infallible, they can be wrong. Needless to say they can only be rejected or refused if they are in direct contradiction with infallible teachings of the Church’s Magisterium. This is the case with the teachings of Vatican II, which refused to use its charisma of infallibility. It is an act of the Authentic Magisterium, which reiterates many dogmas infallibly taught by the Extraordinary and Ordinary Magisterium, but which also includes novelties, such as religious liberty, ecumenism and collegiality which must be refused because they are in direct contradiction with the Church’s previous teachings, e.g., Pius IX in Quanta Cura & Pius XI in Mortalium animos.  [Answered by Fr. Peter R. Scott]

Did Jesus have a brother named James?

James the Lesser was a cousin of Our Lord, and not at all a son of the Blessed Mother. However, the Greek work for brother, adelphos, is also used for close relatives, and as well as brother also has a meaning rather like the English word brethren. The New Testament certainly speaks about Jesus’ brethren, but by a false translation protestants pretend that his brethren were his brothers and make the sacrilegious and blasphemous heretical statement that the Blessed Mother did not always remain a virgin. It is sacrilegious because it speaks of the Blessed Virgin Mary as if she were a regular woman, not one consecrated to be the Mother of God. It is blasphemous for it treats of the Incarnation of the Son of God as if it were not a divine work, brought about by the overshadowing of the Holy Ghost. It is heretical because it denies the dogma of the perpetual virginity of the Blessed Virgin Mary, first formally defined by the Second Ecumenical Council of Constantinople in 553 (Dz 214 & 218).  [Answered by Fr. Peter R. Scott]

Should the mother or the father be responsible for teaching children their catechism?

The very formulation of the question presupposes a false dichotomy, since both are responsible. Yet, both are not responsible equally and in the same way.

Since the father is the head of the family, he has the responsibility for planning, and foresight is his prerogative and duty. His is the responsibility to look to the future, and to plan out the religious formation of his children, just as it is his duty to lead the family in prayer and other religious activities. He has no right to opt out of all involvement, on the grounds that he is not home long enough, but must act towards his family as Christ, who is the invisible head of the mystical body, the Catholic Church. His paternal prudence requires that he determine how and when his children’s religious education is to take place, even if he is not able to do it himself.

Ed Willock had this to say a half century ago: 

Few fathers realize their own dignity as fathers, and few see the unique role that the Church insists that they plan in this work of revolutionary change (i.e., the formation of character in children). He should recognize that the American tradition of the last quarter century, which assigns to him the role of eternal adolescence, is a belittlement of his vocation. He is the bridge between Church and State. He is the bridge between state and family. He is the bridge between family and Church. (In Fatherhood and Family, Angelus Press, p. 81).

However, the mother is the one who is responsible for the daily implementation of her husband’s foresight. She is the one who will teach them the holy names of Jesus and Mary in her knees, and who will repeatedly go over their catechism questions with them by heart.

Nevertheless, as the children grow older the father’s role in the actual teaching of the Faith ought to increase, inasmuch as it is possible. It is he who ought to lead family discussions defending the great teachings on the Faith, and who must instruct his children on how to defend their Faith out in the world, and how also to defend the Church. By so doing, his authority and leadership will make the learning and expression of the Faith a profound reality in the lives of his children, instead of a superficial veneer.  [Answered by Fr. Peter R. Scott]

What is liberalism?

The difficulty in defining liberalism lies in its continual evolving and ever changing ideas, always mutating into new, more or less radical forms. It is often very difficult to seize hold of, penetrating as it does in varying degrees, more or less well camouflaged, into every aspect of human activity and thought.

However, the principles of liberalism are very clear, and once they are understood the intellectual and moral perversion of this way of thinking and acting can be clearly seen.

Fr. Roussel, in his excellent work Liberalism & Catholicism [available from Angelus Press], defines the liberal in this way:  "The liberal is a fanatic for independence, and proclaims it in every domain, even unto absurdity" (p.6). Consequently it consists not in any particular doctrine, but in a way of thinking. Liberalism is a sickness of the mind, an orientation rather than a school, a perversion of sentiment based on pride, or a state of mind rather than a sect. Liberalism appears then as "a disordered affection of man for his independent liberty, which makes him abhor any limit, bond, yoke or discipline from the law or from authority" (Ibid. p.8).

The other author whose excellent exposé of liberalism is much recommended is Fr. Sarda y Salvany, in What Is Liberalism? He outlines in this way the radical principles which are the basis of its propaganda:

1. The absolute sovereignty of the individual in his entire independence of God and God’s authority.

2. The absolute sovereignty of society in its entire independence of everything which does not proceed from itself.

3. Absolute civil sovereignty in the implied right of the people to make their own laws in entire independence and utter disregard of any other criterion than the popular will expressed at the polls and in parliamentary majorities.

4. Absolute freedom of thought in politics, moral, or in religion. The unrestrained liberty of the press (pp.18,19).

It is consequently the placing of the individual, society, the people or freedom as absolutes in themselves, over and above Almighty God. One might wonder how it is that Catholics, who of our nature profess submission to God through our holy religion, could fall into such a trap. The answer is our natural desire of independence, on account of which liberalism is in accord with our fallen depraved human nature, and our natural tendency to follow Lucifer’s rebellious refusal to serve. Consequently we are always inventing ways to compromise the absolutes of our Faith with the spirit of the world, entirely penetrated by liberalism. Hence the development of "Catholic" liberalism throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, that Archbishop Lefebvre does not hesitate to stigmatize as "the great betrayal." For an understanding of how these liberal principles became accepted by Vatican II, producing the novelty of religious liberty, the revolutionary idea that all religions should be equally free for as long as they do not impinge on others’ freedom, which is nothing short of the denial of the Social Kingship of Christ, I refer you to the magnificent exposé by Archbishop Lefebvre in They Have Uncrowned Him [available from Angelus Press].

Allow me to sum up by quoting the magnificent 1888 encyclical of Pope Leo XIII, Libertas Praestantissimum [available from Angelus Press], in which he describes and condemns the varying kinds and degrees of liberalism, from the radical liberalism of those who refuse the Catholic Faith and the Catholic Church to the moderate liberalism of those who promote separation of Church and State, or maintain that the Church ought to adapt itself to modern systems of government:

To deny the existence of this authority in God, or to refuse to submit to it, means to act, not as a free man, but as one who treasonably abuses his liberty; and in such a disposition of mind the chief and deadly vice of liberalism essentially consists. The form, however, of the sin is manifold: for in more ways than one can the will depart from the obedience which is due to God or to those who share the divine power (§36).  [Answered by Fr. Peter R. Scott]

What is collegiality?

Collegiality is the application to the Church of the principles of democracy, founded on the freemasonic revolutionary slogan of "liberty, equality, fraternity."  It is an alternate, brought about since Vatican II, to the monarchical and hierarchical structure instituted by Christ, based upon personal responsibility of priests, bishops and popes standing in Christ’s place. In fact, at the present time two parallel authorities exist for the government of the Church. On the one hand is the divinely instituted hierarchical authority, expressed through the pope and the Roman Congregations over the entire Church, the bishops over their dioceses, and the priests in their parishes. On the other hand is the revolutionary and democratic authority, a human creation imposed since Vatican II, according to which the episcopal college also has the authority to govern the entire church, the episcopal conferences of each country also have the authority to tell the bishops how to govern their dioceses, the presbyteral council also counterbalances and limits the authority of the bishop in his diocese, and the parish council makes the important decisions in parish government. Needless to say, there is a direct contradiction between these two authorities, and any authoritative government of the Church, including condemnation of heresies, is entirely paralyzed.

The most dangerous aspect of collegiality is this theory as it applies to the supreme authority of the Church in matters of Faith and Morals. Previously it was taught that this authority was entirely in the person of the Sovereign Pontiff, Vicar of Christ, who can share this authority with the entire episcopate at the time of an Ecumenical Council. The Vatican II document on the Church, Lumen Gentium, teaches the novelty that an episcopal college exists at all times, and that the bishops throughout the whole world make up that college, which, together with the pope, has the supreme authority. The college is consequently established as an alternate authority to that of the pope alone, and this at all times, regardless of the pope’s will. The pope is consequently not able to go against the democratic majority of bishops, whose authority is equal to his, provided that these bishops are in communion with him. It is in these words that Lumen Gentium states this:

The order of bishops is the successor to the college of apostles in their role as teachers and pastors, and in it the apostolic college is perpetuated. Together with their head, the Supreme Pontiff, and never a part from him, they have supreme and full authority over the universal Church (§22).

We thank God that this denial of the primacy of the pope is contradicted by the Nota Explicativa that the more traditional Fathers at Vatican II forced Pope Paul VI to add to Lumen Gentium. However, the liberal theologians do not take this explanatory note into account, and all they retained is the new collegiality, and its paralysis of personal authority. Romano Amerio in Iota Unum [Available from Angelus Press] has this comment to make:

There is a conflict between a process of democratization and the divinely constituted nature of the Church.…The Church …did not form itself, nor did it establish its own government; in its essentials it was established in toto by Christ, who established its laws and laid down its constitution before summoning mankind to join it…. The Church is therefore a unique kind of society, in which the head exists before the members and authority exists prior to the community. Any view that sees the Church as being based upon the people of God, conceived of in a democratic sense ...is at odds with the reality of the Church. (Romano Amerio, Iota Unum, pp.522-523)

[Answered by Fr. Peter R. Scott]

If we are to say that Mary is the Mother of God, must we not also admit that she is Mother of the Divinity?

It is a Catholic dogma that Mary is the Mother of God, as defined by the Council of Ephesus (431) against the heresy of the Nestorians. The Nestorians refused to acknowledge her title as Theotokos or Mother of God, and only wanted to designate her as Mother of Man or Mother of Christ. For they denied that the divine and human natures were united in the one person of the Son of God, and that consequently Mary is His mother according to His human nature.

This doctrine is well summarized by Dr. Ludwig Ott (Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma, pp.196, 197), who points out that the dogma of Mary’s motherhood of God contains two truths, namely that Mary is truly a mother, by contributing to the human nature of Christ, and that she truly is the Mother of God, "that is, she conceived and bore the Second Person of the Divinity, not indeed according to the Divine Nature, but according to the assumed human nature." It was precisely the objection of Nestorius that if Mary were the Mother of God, then Christ would have had to have taken not only His human nature, but also His divine nature from her, a creature. The answer is that it is not the nature which is conceived and born, but the person.

It is true that there is a contrary heresy to that of the Nestorians, that of the Monophysites, condemned by the Council of Chalcedon 20 years later (451). It maintains that the divine and human natures in Christ are somehow merged together. Since they hold no distinction between the divine and human natures, it follows that Mary is no longer Mother of God simply according to the assumed human nature, as taught by the Councils of Ephesus and Chalcedon. Ott has this to say of this theory which by mingling the divinity and humanity of Christ ends up by destroying both of them:

The Fathers also point out the intrinsic impossibility of the monophysite doctrine of unification. It contradicts the absolute immutability and the infinite perfection of God, and by abrogating the true humanity of Christ, leads to the destruction of the work of redemption (ibid. p.147).

It is consequently a doctrine of our Catholic Faith to affirm that Mary to be "Mother of God according to human nature" (Dz, 148). If anyone were to say that she were also Mother of the Divine Nature, he would imply a confusion of the two natures and he would have fallen into the Monophysite heresy, and he would certainly not be a true defender of the honor of the Blessed Mother. This is a good example of the importance of the careful scholastic definitions of such notions as "person" and "nature" to have an accurate understanding of the Catholic Faith.  [Answered by Fr. Peter R. Scott]

When a "born-again" Protestant strikes up a conversation by asking "Who is Jesus?" and "Do you have a personal relationship with Him?" what is a good way to reply?

I would turn these questions around to the Catholic perspective and rephrase them in terms of the Catechism. As they stand, they are in fact Protestant questions, based upon the false assumption that religion is a matter of personal experience. In answer to the question about who Jesus is, I would explain the hypostatic union of the human and divine natures, which makes up the mystery of the Incarnation, upon which our Redemption is based. With respect to the question on the personal relationship, I would explain what sanctifying grace is, and how it transforms one’s life to be thus filled with the theological virtues of Faith, Hope and Charity.  [Answered by Fr. Peter R. Scott]

Of what evil is God speaking in Is. 45:7 when he says: "I make peace and create evil: I the Lord that do all these things"?

The difficulty is to understand in what way it can be said that God created evil, and is answered by St. Thomas Aquinas in the Summa Theologica, Ia, Q.49, A.2. It is interesting to see how he overcomes the ancient dualism of the Persians, the temptation which maintained that there were two principles, one of good and one of evil.

His response presupposes the true explanation of what evil really is, namely the privation of a good which is due; that is, a defect in that which is done, either in the moral order (=sin, or moral evil) or in the physical order (e.g., sickness, suffering, death). The consequence is that evil is something negative, which cannot exist in itself, but only in something which is good. As Fr. Farrell explains:

The trouble is that evil is not something positive, something one can put a finger on; the very essence of evil demands that it eludes your finger, it is something missing, a defect. To have evil at all, there must be good capable of having holes in it, for evil is precisely a hole in the good (A Companion to the Summa, Vol. I, p.168).

Clearly, then, God, who is the Supreme Good, causes the good which evil is in. However, it cannot be by a defect of His action that the defect or hole in the good exists. It is by a defect in the action of the creature which He permits, but does not cause. God permits such defects in the action of creatures in view of the good of the order of the universe. Now the good of the order of the universe requires...that there should be some things that can, and sometimes do, fail. And thus God, by causing in things the good of the universe, consequently, and as if it were by accident, causes the corruptions of things... (ST, Ia, Q. 49, A. 2).

This applies also to moral evil or sin. He causes the good which is human life in the sinner, and He even gives the intellect and willpower without which the sinner could not sin. However, the sin itself is a defect in the activity of the sinner which comes entirely from the sinner. This gives some little idea of the gravity and perversity of mortal sin.

However, St. Thomas points out, there is another way in which He is the cause of evil, and it is referred to in Holy Scripture in passages such as this one from the prophet Isaias. For He is the cause of evils inasmuch as they are a necessary penalty or punishmen